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Abstract. According to evolutionary game theory, cooperation in pub-
lic goods games is eliminated by free-riders, yet in nature, cooperation
is ubiquitous. Artificial models resolve this contradiction via the mech-
anism of network reciprocity. However, existing research only addresses
pre-existing networks and does not specifically consider their origins. Fur-
ther, much work has focused on scale-free networks and so pre-supposes
attachment mechanisms which may not exist in nature. We present a
coevolutionary model of public goods games in networks, growing by
random attachment, from small founding populations of simple agents.
The model demonstrates the emergence of cooperation in moderately
heterogeneous networks, regardless of original founders’ behaviour, and
absent higher cognitive abilities such as recognition or memory. It may
thus illustrate a more general mechanism for the evolution of coopera-
tion, from early origins, in minimally cognitive organisms. It is the first
example of a model explaining cooperation in public goods games on
growing networks.
Keywords: Evolution of cooperation · Evolutionary game theory · Pub-
lic goods game · Complex networks
1 Introduction
The prisoner’s dilemma has become a standard metaphor to represent coopera-
tion in evolutionary game theory, however it only describes interactions between
pairs of individuals. In nature, interactions are not necessarily constrained in
this way and a broader representation of cooperation is useful, particularly in
the case of social, economic and biological networks [1]. For such scenarios, the
public goods game (PGG) offers a suitable alternative for groups of more than
two members. Referred to variously, as the N-player prisoner’s dilemma, the free-
rider problem, or the tragedy of the commons [2], the PGG represents a group-
based dilemma where there exists a tension between benefits to an individual
following one (selfish) course of action versus benefits to the entire community
if the individual chooses an alternative action.
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The formulation of the PGG is as follows: Each member of a group has the
opportunity to contribute a ‘cost’ to a central ‘pot’. They can choose to con-
tribute, or not. The amount invested in the pot is then increased by a multiplier.
The increased amount is divided amongst all members of the group, regardless
of whether they contributed or not. Those contributing to the pot can be con-
sidered cooperators whilst those withholding, defectors (free-riders). As with the
prisoner’s dilemma, the choice which maximises payoff is to not contribute (to
defect). Thus in the rational analysis, all individuals will choose to act selfishly,
which will result in the worst case scenario for all: the minimisation of the public
good. In nature however, the rational choice appears less appealing and commu-
nities are observed to cooperate, so as to preserve or maintain public goods.
Attempts to explain this apparent contradiction between theory and observed
behaviour consider the importance of factors such as volunteering, reputation,
punishment or reward [3,4,5]. Whilst it is easy to appreciate that such factors
may affect the choices of, for example, humans, higher primates or birds, it is
harder to extend such approaches to explaining cooperation in more primitive
forms of life [6] such as microorganisms cooperating to establish protective shel-
ters, forage for nutrients or aid dispersal [7]. In such cases, network reciprocity
may offer an alternative explanation, requiring fewer assumptions.
The effect of spatial structure on cooperation was first highlighted in [8].
Whereas evolutionary game theory shows that cooperation cannot survive in
evenly mixed populations, the presence of spatial relationships allows cooper-
ators to cluster. This clustering increases their individual fitnesses and thus
prevents extinction by defectors. Further research developed these findings to
illustrate that heterogeneity of network structure promotes cooperation, in the
case of pair-wise interactions modelled using the prisoner’s dilemma [9]. A sim-
ilar approach modelling group-wise interactions, using the PGG, was described
in the work of [10]. Here, the mean field formulation of the PGG was spatially
extended by mapping agents playing PGG to nodes of a network. The results of
this work illustrated the emergence of cooperation on scale-free networks, thus
reinforcing previous findings regarding pair-wise (prisoner’s dilemma) coopera-
tion [9].
Existing research has therefore established a consistent view of the positive
role heterogeneous networks play in promoting cooperation, however the over-
whelming majority of this work has focused on the pair-wise prisoner’s dilemma
and has primarily considered static networks. (A useful review of work focusing
specifically on the PGG in networks may be be found in [1]). Of the limited
body of research that exists for cooperation in dynamic networks, most has fo-
cused on networks at some form of equilibrium, using approaches which involve
modification of pre-existing (fully formed) networks (see reviews in [11,12]). A
very limited number of publications consider network growth [13,14,15]; all of
the latter focusing on prisoner’s dilemma.
In this report we offer an initial attempt to fill this gap: We consider the
growth of a population from its earliest origins and we ask how the social net-
work affects and is affected by the group behaviour of the individuals within it.
Our aim is to establish a model based on group-wise cooperation which demon-
strates the growth of networked populations of cooperative agents from original
founder members. For such a model to be of value, it cannot be initially assumed
that founder members are cooperators. Further, for the model to be broadly ap-
plicable, the sort of cognitive abilities (memory, recognition, reasoning) that are
required for reciprocity or retaliation cannot be assumed. Finally for the model
to be general, we make the simplest possible assumptions about the mechanism
that new nodes use to attach to the existing network (i.e., we do not use prefer-
ential attachment).
2 Background
Here we discuss two models on which we have based our work and explain the
rationale for the adaptations made in incorporating these into a single model. We
provide this explanation in terms of the dynamic aspects of our model, divided
into the two separate processes of attrition and growth.
2.1 An Existing Network Representation of the Public Goods
Game
It has been demonstrated in [10] that heterogeneous network structure pro-
motes cooperation in public goods games within static networks. The approach
used represented a population in the form of multiple sub-groupings (neighbour-
hoods), each of which constitutes a PGG. More specifically, each node in the
network initiates a single PGG and is also a participant in games initiated by
its neighbours. Hence each node takes part in g = k + 1 games where k rep-
resents the degree of the node occupied by the agent. An agent x with direct
connections to neighbours a and b therefore has a degree of 2 and takes part
in 3 PGGs: the one initiated by itself and the ones initiated by its neighbours
a and b. The total number of games in a population is therefore equal to N ,
the number of agents in the population. Within this work (ibid.), two variants
of the PGG model were investigated, i) where each agent had a fixed cost per
game (FCPG) and therefore their overall contribution was proportional to g,
and ii) where each agent had a total fixed cost (fixed cost per individual, FCPI)
and therefore their contribution was divided between all g games. The game-
playing populations are incorporated into evolutionary simulations by means of
a strategy updating process representing natural selection. Within this step, the
strategies (behaviours) of fitter nodes probabilistically displace those of less fit
neighbours.
We aim to use the above approach as a basis from which to develop an
extended dynamic model that simulates growth from founding members. This
naturalistic model is intended to explain the development of cooperation with
respect to early origins of a population.
2.2 An Existing Model of Cooperative Network Growth
We take as our inspiration for developing a dynamic PGG model, the work of [13],
who notably connected the dynamic structure of a network to the behaviour of
agents within the network. In this approach, evolutionary processes, preferential
attachment and agent behaviour were incorporated into a unified model of dy-
namic network-reciprocal cooperation (using the prisoner’s dilemma), referred
to as evolutionary preferential attachment (EPA).
2.3 Proposed Attrition Mechanism
In the EPA model, strategy updating still forms the primary evolutionary com-
ponent, with selection acting on relative fitnesses resulting from agent-agent
interactions. However, EPA also incorporates a secondary evolutionary mecha-
nism into the growth processes of the social network. Within our model, we shift
this secondary evolutionary component over to shrinkage of the network. Specif-
ically, this ‘global’ effect causes death of less fit individual agents. We consider
this revision offers a model more analogous to the processes of selection in real
world evolutionary situations. Such a shift separates evolutionary effects from
the attachment processes responsible for network growth.
To implement such a culling mechanism, we impose a nominal maximum
population size which is analogous to the concept of ‘carrying capacity’, as used
in population biology. In this sense, the size of a population shrinks in response to
extrinsic factors which are the result of environmental effects (such as predation,
disease, food availability, many of which may be seasonal variations).
2.4 Proposed Growth Mechanism
The positive effect of scale-free degree distribution has featured significantly in
research into the emergence of cooperation in networks [11]. However, we note
that the fitness or degree-based mechanisms of preferential attachment, which
are likely to be responsible for such structures, require underlying explanations
for each occasion where they are found (for example, what specific process would
enable a newcomer joining, or born into a population, to identify the fittest or
most well-connected member in that situation). Clearly preferential mechanisms
exist (although disagreements have arisen over claims in this respect [16,17]),
however we suggest it is important that a general model for cooperation should
be viable in the absence of mechanisms which require additional ‘case-by-case’
explanations or assumptions (even if when present they may further enhance
cooperation).
To overcome these concerns, we implement the connection of new nodes to
the existing network as an entirely random process. Such a mechanism does not
cause the development of a simple Poisson degree distribution as would be found
in a random network: chronological random attachment (CRA) results in older
nodes having more connections. In the absence of other influences, the degree
distribution in such a situation becomes exponential—giving a structure with
heterogeneity somewhere between that of random and scale-free networks.
2.5 Summary: A Model of Population Fluctuation in Social
Networks
The two processes described above, attrition of least fit nodes whenever a carry-
ing capacity is reached, and growth of the network by random addition, continue
until the simulation ends. We thus have a fluctuation system which i) supports
the growth of a network from founder members, and ii) overcomes the unreal-
istic situation that a ‘mature’ network becomes fixed structurally. Further, as
intended, this implementation gives us a minimal model which does not require
assumption of higher cognitive abilities for its individual members and has no
requirement regarding specific underlying mechanisms for the social network
structure formation. This model, described in more detail below, is an exten-
sion of our earlier work [14], which considered preferential attachment and the
prisoner’s dilemma game.
3 Methods
Our model describes agents located at the nodes of networks. Interactions occur
between agents on nodes that have connecting edges. Each node in the network
has a ‘neighbourhood’, defined by the neighbours its edges connect to. A PGG
occurs for each neighbourhood and hence a network of N nodes will result in
N PGGs. Agents can contribute to a PGG (cooperate) or not (defect). Each
agent in the network has a behaviour encoded by a ‘strategy’ variable repre-
senting either ‘cooperate’ or ‘defect’. In a round robin fashion, each agent in
turn initiates a PGG which involves their primary connected neighbours (their
neighbourhood). Each agent in the population accumulates a fitness score which
is the sum of its rewards from all the PGGs it participates in.
Within the evolutionary simulation, this process is repeated over generations.
Agents are assessed at each generation, on the basis of their fitness score: Fit-
ter agents’ strategies remain unchanged; less fit agents are more likely to have
strategies displaced by those of fitter neighbours. Fluctuation of the population
occurs by repeated attrition and regrowth of the network.
The general outline of the evolutionary process, for one generation, is as
follows:
1. Play public goods games: Each agent initiates a PGG involving its neigh-
bours. Each agent will accumulate a fitness score that is the sum of payoffs
from all the individual PGGs that it participates in.
2. Update strategies: Selection occurs. Agents with low scores will have their
strategies replaced, on a probabilistic basis, by comparison with the fitness
scores of randomly selected neighbours.
3. Remove nodes: If the network has reached the nominal maximum size, it is
pruned by a tournament selection process that removes less fit agents.
4. Grow network : A specified number of new nodes are added to the network,
each connecting to m randomly selected distinct existing nodes via m edges.
In the following, we provide more detail on the specifics of each of the four steps:
Play public goods games. Each node of the network, in turn, initiates a PGG.
Within a single PGG, all cooperator members of a neighbourhood contribute a
cost c to ‘the pot’. The resulting collective investment I is multiplied by r, and
rI is then divided equally amongst all members of the neighbourhood, regardless
of strategy.
In the FCPG variant of the PGG, each agent has a fixed cost per game and
therefore their overall contribution, in one generation, is c(k + 1) with contri-
bution c to each game, and where k is the number of neighbours (degree). The
single game individual payoffs of an agent x are given by the following equations,
for scenarios where x is a defector (PD) and a cooperator (PC) respectively:
PD = crnc/(kx + 1) , (1)
PC = PD − c , (2)
where c is the cost contributed by each cooperator, r is the reward multiplier,
nc is the number of cooperators in the neighbourhood based around x, and kx
is the degree of x.
In the FCPI variant, each individual has a fixed cost c, i.e. their overall
contribution is c and hence their contribution to each game is c/(k + 1). The
single game individual payoff for a node y having strategy sy (= 1 if cooperator,
= 0 if defector) present in the neighbourhood of x is given by:
Py,x =
r
kx + 1
kx∑
i=0
c
ki + 1
si − c
ky + 1
sy , (3)
where i is used to index each neighbour of x, and si is the strategy of neigh-
bour i of x having degree ki.
Update strategies. Each node i selects a neighbour j at random. If the fitness
of node i, fi is greater or equal to the neighbour’s fitness fj , then i’s strategy is
unchanged. If the fitness of node i, fi is less than the neighbour’s fitness, fj , then
i’s strategy is replaced by a copy of the neighbour j’s strategy, according to a
probability proportional to the difference between their fitness values. Thus poor
scoring nodes have strategies displaced by those of more successful neighbours.
Hence, at generation t, if fi(t) ≥ fj(t) then i’s strategy remains unchanged.
If fi(t) < fj(t) then i’s strategy is replaced with that of the neighbour j with
the following probability:
ΠUi(t) =
fj(t)− fi(t)
max(ki(t), kj(t))
, (4)
where ki and kj are degrees of node i and its neighbour j respectively. The
purpose of the denominator is to normalise the difference between the two nodes.
The term max(ki(t), kj(t)) represents the largest achievable fitness difference
between the two nodes given their respective degrees.
Grow network. New nodes, with randomly allocated strategies, are added to
achieve a total of 10 at each generation. Each new node uses m = 2 edges to
connect to existing nodes. Duplicate edges and self-edges are not allowed. The
probability ΠGi(t) that an existing node i receives one of the m new edges is
given by:
ΠGi(t) =
1
N(t)
, (5)
where N(t) is the number of nodes available to connect to at time t in the
existing population. Given that in our model each new node extends m = 2
new edges, and multiple edges are not allowed, N is therefore sampled without
replacement. Growth continues until a nominal maximum size (we used 1000
nodes) is achieved.
Remove nodes (for fluctuation simulations). On achieving or exceeding
the nominal maximum size, the network is pruned by a percentage X. This is
achieved by repeated tournament selection using a tournament size equivalent
to 1% of the population. Tournament members are selected randomly from the
population. The tournament member having the least fitness is the ‘winner’ and
is added to a short list of nodes to be deleted. Tournament selection continues
until the short list of X% nodes for deletion is fully populated.
The nodes on the short list (and all of their edges) are removed from the
network. Any nodes that become isolated from the network as a result of this
process are also deleted. (Failure to do this would result in small numbers of
single, disconnected, non-playing nodes, having static strategies and zero fitness
values.) When there are multiple nodes of equivalent low fitness value, the selec-
tion is effectively random (on the basis that the members were originally picked
from the population randomly). Where X = 0, no attrition occurs; in this case,
on reaching maximum size, the network structure would become static.
General simulation conditions. Initial strategy types of founder nodes were
specified in simulation setup (either 3 cooperators or 3 defectors). Strategy types
of subsequently added nodes were allocated independently, uniformly, at random
(cooperators and defectors with equal probability). All networks had an overall
average degree of approximately k = 4, giving an average neighbourhood size
of g = 5. Simulations were run until 20,000 generations. The final ‘fraction of
cooperators’ values we use are means, averaged over the last 20 generations of
each simulation, in order to compensate for variability that might occur from
just using final generation values. Each simulation consisted of 25 replicates. We
used shrinkage value of X = 2.5% for all fluctuation simulations. Simulation
data is recorded after step 2 (Update strategies).
4 Results and Discussion
We now present the results of research investigating our model’s ability to sup-
port cooperation in a range of simulations. Initially we consider its implementa-
tion in the type of scenarios that have dominated research into cooperation in
dynamic networks, namely fully formed or ‘pre-existing’ networks. We then ap-
ply the model, as per our original motivation, to consider networks grown from
a small number of founding members. In both types of investigation we have
considered the two variants of PGG described in [10]: FCPG and FCPI.
4.1 Simulations using Pre-existing Networks
We first consider the impact of our model in pre-existing networks. We initially
consider the effect of the PGG variant (FCPG vs. FCPI) and subsequently we
discuss specifically how the fluctuation mechanism achieves different outcomes
to those seen for static networks.
Effect of PGG Variant in Simulations using Pre-existing Networks.
It is established for the 2-player PGG (the prisoner’s dilemma) that cooperation
in pair-wise interactions on networks is promoted by the opportunity for coop-
erators to self-assort and form inter-connected groups (clusters) [8]. The larger
the clusters which form, the greater the levels of cooperation which occur [9].
This effect is therefore enhanced by increased network degree heterogeneity, since
greater heterogeneity allows for increasingly larger connected groups of cooper-
ators within the network. Such findings for the prisoner’s dilemma generalise
to the PGG, however in the PGG there is also an opposing ‘force’ that limits
cooperation, which we now explain. In the conventional FCPG representation
of the PGG, an individual pays a cost for every single game they participate
in. Since each individual in a population can initiate a PGG among their local
neighbourhood, higher connectivity (more neighbours) means that an individual
will participate in more games and will thus pay a penalty for their increased
connectivity [18]. The classical result for the PGG in this case, is that the larger
the neighbourhoods become, the less likely cooperation is. This finding makes
intuitive sense, since the larger a PGG neighbourhood is, the closer it gets to
representing a mean field scenario, where defection is the Nash equilibrium.
In Fig. 1a, (FCPG in static networks) we see that higher levels of cooperation
are observed in static scale-free networks (green line with ‘x’ markers) than in
networks of low or no heterogeneity—random and regular respectively. These
results are consistent with the view that heterogeneity promotes cooperation. In
the case of FCPI PGG (see Fig. 1b), the lack of any penalty on larger neigh-
bourhood size weakens the dilemma i.e. it reduces the ‘temptation to defect’ and
therefore increases levels of cooperation. By comparing corresponding lines for
FCPG and FCPI PGG in Figs. 1a and b, we can see how FCPI causes different
horizontal shifts in cooperation profiles for networks of differing heterogeneity.
We thus see that the impact of FCPI is nonexistent for regular networks (no
visible shift, see blue lines with triangle markers) and becomes more relevant as
increasing heterogeneity allows for increasing neighbourhood size (marked shift
for scale-free networks, see green lines with ‘x’ markers).
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Fig. 1. Plots comparing the effect of network type for simulations (25 replicates) on
pre-existing networks of increasing heterogeneity (regular, random and scale-free re-
spectively). Final fraction of cooperators in population is plotted against η, the PGG
reward multiplier r, normalised with respect to average neighbourhood size (g = 5).
Variability is indicated by error bars showing 95% confidence intervals. Simulation de-
tails are as described in Methods section. The dashed line at η = 0.6 is a reference for
the eye.
Figures 1c and d illustrate the effect of PGG variant in fluctuating networks.
Here we expect to see two general results: i) Given that the fluctuation mecha-
nism drives all networks to the same final degree distribution, we would expect
similar result profiles, within each variant of the PGG, regardless of starting
network topology; ii) Further, we would expect these profiles, based on approx-
imately exponentially distributed final networks, to lie somewhere between the
two extremes of heterogeneity represented by scale-free (highly heterogeneous)
and regular (non heterogeneous) networks, as observed in the static FCPI results
(see Fig. 1b).
We find that the CRA-fluctuation profiles do indeed lie within the expected
region of the graph, however we see an anomaly for the scale-free FCPI result
(Fig. 1d) which achieves higher levels of cooperation than regular and random
networks. This result is unexpected because given an assumption that coopera-
tion is only dependent on the final degree distribution, we would expect to see
the same result profiles for all network types. We have compared final degree
distributions for all network types and find no discernible difference.
We propose that the explanation for the anomaly seen for initially scale-
free networks lies in the differing challenges presented by the topology of the
initial networks; specifically, the diameter of the network (rather than the degree
distribution). We have measured the average shortest path length in our initial
networks and find these to be approximately: 125 for regular networks, infinite
(network disconnected) for random networks , and 4 for scale-free networks. Final
networks have lengths of 6 in the case of FCPG and 7 in the case of FCPI. In order
for cooperation to percolate through the network, sufficient reward (η) has to be
present to drive assortativity by strategy, however assortativity will inevitably
be impeded in those cases where the network is fragmented or does not have the
small path lengths that are a defining characteristic of small-world networks. In
such cases, cooperation cannot readily percolate, until the fluctuation mechanism
has brought about sufficient changes to reduce the average path length and/or
the number of network components. Whilst cooperation in scale-free networks
is still dependent upon the value of η, such networks do not have to overcome
the path length issues faced by random and regular networks. Thus, while all
network topologies end up with the same final degree distributions, scale-free
networks potentially start with a ‘small-world’ advantage which may support
the emergence of cooperation at lower values of η.
This proposed explanation raises the question of why a difference exists be-
tween scale-free network results for FCPG and FCPI (see Figs. 1c and d). In
response to this, our above explanation does indeed apply to fluctuating scale-
free networks for both variants of the PGG, however in the case of FCPG,
cooperation is limited by the additional constraint of neighbourhood size.
Effect of Static vs. Fluctuating Networks. As reported in the work of [15], a
model based on fluctuating population size can promote cooperation in networks.
This outcome arises from the greater opportunity for strategies to self-assort,
given repeated perturbation of network structure, due to deletions of low fitness
nodes.
From comparing Figs. 1a and c, we see how the incorporation of popula-
tion fluctuation affects results for FCPG. Profiles for all network types are now
superimposed. We observe similar findings in the case of FCPI (compare Figs.
1b and d) except for in the case of scale-free networks—an anomaly which, as
explained earlier, is believed to be due to the ‘beneficial’ impact of short average
path lengths found in initially scale-free networks. The general consistency of
cooperation profiles is because the CRA-fluctuation mechanism converts all net-
works to the same final degree distribution regardless of initial topology. Figure
2 illustrates this conversion by showing initial and final degree distributions in
simulations starting from a scale-free network. We note that whilst the final de-
gree distribution due to CRA alone would be exponential, the additional effect
of node deletion compresses the exponential curve, giving a degree heterogeneity
lying between that of a Gaussian and an exponential distribution.
We highlight an important point here. CRA-fluctuation converts all net-
works, regardless of initial type to this compressed exponential distribution
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Fig. 2. a) Graph illustrating initial and final degree distributions (25 replicates) for an
initially scale-free network, of 1000 nodes, subjected to CRA-fluctuation. As a reference,
the dashed black line represents the exponential distribution of a network ‘built’ by
CRA—without any node deletion. To highlight characteristic distribution profiles, the
same data is also presented on, b) lin-log (exponential appears as a straight line), and
c) log-log (scale-free appears as straight line) scales. For clarity, the x axis is truncated
for plots a and b. Data is shown with error bars representing 95% confidence intervals.
(The presence of small numbers of nodes of degree 1 is an artefact of our implementation
of fluctuation: Whilst all new nodes initially have m = 2 edges, the deletion process
may leave limited numbers of nodes with a single edge.)
which has moderate heterogeneity. In the case of scale-free networks, fluctuation
therefore brings about a decrease in heterogeneity. Hence for initially scale-free
networks, we should expect to see reduced cooperation in the fluctuation model
compared to the static one. This is indeed true for FCPI results (green lines
with ‘x’ markers in Figs. 1b and d) but not the case for FCPG (Figs. 1a and c).
Fluctuation does not cause the expected reduction in FCPG PGG because in
the static FCPG implementation, scale-free networks are already constrained in
their ability to cooperate i.e. they cannot achieve their full potential in support-
ing cooperation due to the penalties FCPG imposes on large neighbourhoods.
Figure 3 presents our results so as to separately illustrate the impact of fluc-
tuation on each of the network types studied. Here we generally see (comparing
dashed line for all plots) that CRA-fluctuation shows increased or similar lev-
els of cooperation in comparison to results for static networks. We observe this
effect in all cases except FCPI initially scale-free networks (Fig. 3f).
Our general observation here, that cooperation is increased or unchanged by
fluctuation, is primarily a result of the CRA-fluctuation mechanism converting
all networks to the same compressed exponential degree distribution, regardless
of starting topology. Whilst the fluctuation model is in this way able to shift co-
operation profiles to the left (increasing cooperation), such a change can only be
achieved for networks having initially lower heterogeneity (random and regular
networks). Hence, in the case of scale-free (highly heterogeneous) networks, lev-
els of cooperation should be lower in the fluctuating network than in the static
network. Our results for scale-free networks are however not as clear cut as this
simple explanation would suggest and we now provide further clarification of
why this is so.
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Fig. 3. Plots comparing results from networks with static population size to those
where size fluctuates around a nominal maximum value. Three types of pre-existing
networks were investigated: regular, random and scale-free. Final fraction of coopera-
tors in population is plotted against η, the PGG reward multiplier r, normalised with
respect to average neighbourhood size (g = 5). Variability (25 replicates) is indicated
by error bars showing 95% confidence intervals. Simulation details are as described in
Methods section. The dashed line at η = 0.6 is a reference for the eye.
In Fig. 3e, for FCPG PGG on initially scale-free networks, we see no reduction
in levels of cooperation when the fluctuation model is applied. The reason we
do not see such a reduction is because, as highlighted earlier, FCPG restricts
the levels of cooperation that are achievable in heterogeneous networks. This
constraint limits levels of cooperation in the case of static networks and there
is no reason to expect the fluctuation model to be able to overcome such a
constraint. We hence see similar results for both fluctuation and static models in
FCPG PGG. In Fig. 3f, we clearly see how the absence of such a constraint gives
us the expected results. Here, for the fluctating network, we see reduced levels of
cooperation due to CRA-fluctuation reducing the heterogeneity of the network
as it converts it from scale-free to compressed exponential degree distribution.
In summary we make the general observation that fluctuation is more bene-
ficial to cooperation in the case of FCPG. Whereas FCPI enables higher levels
of cooperation to be achieved without the need for such ‘further assistance’.
4.2 Simulations in Networks Grown from Founder Populations
We now report on results of simulations grown from founder populations of
either 3 cooperators, or 3 defectors. We compare two implementations of our
model. In the first (‘non-fluctuating’), the population grows by a process of
CRA until it reaches a maximum size, after which the network structure remains
constant. In the second implementation (‘fluctuating’), the network grows by
means of CRA until it reaches a nominal maximum size, whereupon it is pruned
and then allowed to regrow. This fluctuation cycle repeats thereafter, until the
simulation ends. Strategy updating continues throughout the entirety of both
implementations. As previously, we present results for both FCPG and FCPI
variants of the PGG.
Effect of PGG Variant in Networks Grown from Founder Popula-
tions. In the case of cooperator-founded populations, by comparing correspond-
ing curves (cyan lines) between Figs. 4a and b, it appears that FCPI may result in
a marginal increase in levels of cooperation compared to FCPG. Small increases
would be consistent with our understanding that FCPI can relax the penalty
paid by cooperator clusters in heterogeneous networks. As described earlier,
networks formed by CRA-fluctuation are only moderately heterogeneous, thus
any increase afforded by FCPI over FCPG would be expected to be minor.
In the case of defector-founded populations (red lines in Figs. 4a and b), we
see what may be a minor difference between FCPG and FCPI in fluctuating
networks (dashed lines) and a more marked difference for non-fluctuating net-
works (solid lines). Curiously, FCPG in the case of defector founders appears
to promote rather than restrict cooperation in non-fluctuating networks. Closer
inspection of the data for these specific FCPG simulations shows very high vari-
ability for values of η > 0.8. Here individual replicate simulations proceeded to
either high levels of cooperation or almost complete defection. We have been un-
able to establish a definitive explanation for this effect but strongly suspect that
it is a result of FCPG favouring smaller neighbourhoods. In defector-founded
populations, simulations where many cooperators connect to the large ‘core’
neighbourhood of defectors will only result in further growth of this defector
core, since added cooperators are inevitably converted by the highly-connected
defector core. However in simulations where larger numbers of cooperators ran-
domly attach elsewhere, it may become possible for initially small groups of
cooperators to get a ‘toehold’ in the population away from the main defector
core. Growth of this type, where cooperation arises in smaller clusters away from
the core, may be promoted by FCPG, which by penalising cooperators in larger
neighbourhoods, favours those in smaller ones.
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Fig. 4. Plots comparing results from fluctuating and non-fluctuating simulations, for
networks grown from founder populations (25 replicates). We compare networks grown
from 3 cooperators to those grown from 3 defectors. Final fraction of cooperators in
population is plotted against η, the PGG reward multiplier r, normalised with respect
to average neighbourhood size (g = 5). Populations were specified to have a nominal
maximum size of 1000 individuals, at which point fluctuation is triggered. Variability is
indicated by error bars showing 95% confidence intervals. Further details on simulations
are as described in Methods section. The dashed line at η = 0.6 is a reference for the
eye.
Effect of Founder Population Strategy on Non-fluctuating and Fluc-
tuating Networks. For cooperator-founded populations (blue lines in Figs. 4a
and b), levels of cooperation are not markedly changed by incorporation of fluc-
tuation once the network has reached its maximum size. We propose that the
strategy assortativity that has taken place whilst the network was growing has
maximised the amount of cooperation that can occur (for a given value of η).
Cooperation levels thus do not rise beyond this limit when fluctuation is added.
For the more challenging, defector-founded scenario (red lines in Figs. 4a and
b), fluctuation (dashed lines) brings about a marked increase in cooperation. To
explain this effect we first consider the non-fluctuating system. Here, an initial
defector population converts all nodes that attach to it to defection and hence
significantly biases the growing population against cooperation. The founder de-
fectors develop increased connectivity over subsequent generations and become
a well-connected core of defectors, easily capable of converting any new coopera-
tors that may attach. In the non-fluctuating model, the starting point of defector
founders thus ‘locks in’ long term defector behaviour—to the extent that even
where the dilemma collapses at η = 1, populations can still grow to be predomi-
nantly populated by defectors. In this scenario, rather like the growth of a coral
reef, the core of defectors is ‘dead’. ‘Life’ (positive fitness values) only occurs at
the periphery of the core where new cooperators attach and hence allow defec-
tors to gain positive fitness values. If the new nodes are defectors they instantly
become part of the core; cooperators will do the same as soon as they have played
PGG and been converted to defectors. Thus the defector core continues to grow.
Whilst the core will primarily have zero fitness, it is still however impenetrable
to invasion by cooperators, because they will be instantly converted as soon as
they connect to the periphery of the core.
We now consider how the fluctuation model changes the above scenario
to bring about such a marked increase in cooperation. Both fluctuating and
non-fluctuating models operate identically until the maximum network size is
reached. After this point, in the fluctuating model, the least fit individuals
and the nodes they occupy are deleted from the population. New nodes are
then added which link to randomly selected existing nodes and have randomly
allocated strategies. Thus the defector core which is invulnerable in the non-
fluctuating mode, contains many nodes which are highly vulnerable in the fluc-
tuating model, due to their zero fitness. Our evolutionary model of fluctuating
populations thus creates an escape from the domination of the defector core.
We highlight that a preferential (rather than random) attachment system
for network growth in a defector-founded population as we have described, may
potentially reduce the likelihood of cooperation emerging. This is because in pref-
erential attachment, new nodes would be most likely to connect with existing
nodes of highest degree, i.e. the defector-founders. As a result any cooperators
would be highly likely to be immediately converted to defectors. Random at-
tachment however allows for cooperators to connect elsewhere and hence allows
for the development of cooperator clusters away from the founders where they
are less likely to be converted to defection.
5 Conclusion
In this work we have developed a model of the coevolution of cooperative be-
haviour alongside the growth of a networked population. Importantly, our model
demonstrates the emergence of such behaviour, in networks grown from non-
cooperative founder members. Our results highlight that the absence of any per-
turbation of the system may potentially ‘lock in’ defector behaviour in the long
term—a concept that appears to merit further investigation. We also note the
possibility that, in certain circumstances, preferential attachment can impede
the emergence of network-reciprocal cooperation. In addition to investigating
growing networks, we have applied our model to pre-existing networks, popu-
lated with initially random strategies. Regardless of initial topology, such net-
works achieve a compressed exponential degree distribution and the emergence
of cooperation is observed.
Our model has no requirements for agents to possess higher cognitive abilities
such as memory or recognition. It also does not require underlying explanations
to describe preferential attachment of nodes in network formation. Levels of net-
work heterogeneity that are sufficient for cooperation to emerge, arise simply
by random connections formed over time, combined with attrition of least fit
members of the population. Finally, we highlight that the model supports coop-
eration in cases of costly interaction (FCPG) and also where costs are trivialised
(FCPI), real world scenarios being likely to lie somewhere along a spectrum be-
tween these two extrema. The fluctuation mechanism proposed here is the first
example of a model describing the emergence of group-based cooperation in both
growing and dynamic-equilibrium networks. As such it forms an important step
in understanding the origins of cooperation in networks.
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